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**Africa Review**

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## Africa Review

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Africa Review

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Articles

Botswana: Reaction to the South African Raid

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A deep sense of frustration and humiliation prevails in Gaborone following the raid on 19 May by the South African Defense Force on African National Congress (ANC) targets in Botswana, according to the US Embassy.

Botswana Defense Force (BDF) officials believe the South African operation, which included the wounding of three BDF members in a preventive attack on a base near Gaborone, belittled the BDF and that relations with Pretoria cannot continue as if nothing had happened. The nature of the attack—helicopters and a commando team against an unguarded house—also is regarded by Gaborone as an unnecessary display of power. Nevertheless, in our view, economic realities will force Botswana to resume more congenial relations with South Africa within the next few months. At the same time, however, Gaborone probably realizes that Pretoria is likely to stage more raids in the future.

The South African attack on Botswana, the second within a year, followed months of minor South African incursions along the border and frequent public and private threats by Pretoria. South African surveillance—and Botswana fears of attack—increased after a landmine near the Botswana border in northern Transvaal Province killed two South African whites in January and Pretoria publicly charged Botswana with complicity with ANC insurgents. On 25 January South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha warned of military action if ANC infiltration continued.

In late January, Botswana police outposts reportedly received telephone threats from callers with Afrikaner accents, according to the US Embassy.

Gaborone's sense of frustration probably stems in part from a belief that it had done all it could to appease Pretoria. For example, an ANC publications office, destroyed in a major raid in June 1985, was not allowed to reopen, and the two overt ANC representatives in Gaborone were asked to leave the country last February.

Botswana also stepped up efforts to uncover arms flowing to insurgents in South Africa.

Outlook

We believe that Gaborone will persist in its stated policy of not allowing its territory to be used as a springboard for attacks against South Africa. Botswana's security forces, however, are not capable of completely stopping ANC activity in the country or of seriously challenging South African raids. Furthermore, South Africans are likely to continue to cross the border frequently for surveillance or in pursuit of suspected insurgents without major objections from Gaborone.

Nevertheless, Botswana will continue to resist Pretoria's pressure to sign a formal security pact, in our judgment. This refusal stems partly from its

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opposition to apartheid, but also, according to the US Embassy, from a desire to avoid taking measures against the ANC that might lead to retribution should that group ever come to power in Pretoria. Although security meetings between the two countries may resume, Gaborone probably will refuse to meet regularly or frequently. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Botswana sees these meetings as an opportunity for South African bullying and one-sided exchanges of information. Furthermore, Gaborone probably now believes that these meetings do little to forestall South African attacks and may even be a cover for such plans. [REDACTED]

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## Tanzania: The Military's Political Reveille [ ]

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Tanzania's protracted economic problems have eroded the effectiveness of the armed forces, once among the largest and strongest in black Africa. The Tanzanian military had played an important regional role in the late 1970s and early 1980s and was a pillar of former President Nyerere's regime. Today, however, the economic crisis has taken its toll, and Nyerere's retirement from the presidency threatens military perquisites, causing grumbling in the Army and increasing military concerns about government decisionmaking. Although we believe most military commanders have adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude to the still relatively new government of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, they probably expect Mwinyi to continue Nyerere's practice of granting priority allocation of resources to the military. If the Mwinyi government fails to assuage the military's concerns, we believe the Army will soon play a far more active role on the political scene. [ ]

### Nyerere's Spoiled Children

The Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) had its origins in the British colonial army, the King's African Rifles. The military remained politically passive in the years immediately following independence in 1961, but in January 1964 a large number of soldiers mutinied over low pay and lack of promotional opportunities. Nyerere quelled the rebellion with the help of British marines and moved to create a more politically reliable force. [ ]

The TPDF, numbering approximately 55,000 men, has benefited from Nyerere's patronage in a variety of ways:

- Nyerere attracted considerable outside military assistance and training, primarily from the Soviet Union after brief supply relationships with Canada and China. Major Soviet assistance began in the mid-1970s and escalated during Tanzania's involvement in Uganda in 1978-81. To date, US defense officials estimate that Moscow has provided more than \$400 million in military aid. This has

included jet fighters, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, early warning radar, surface-to-air missiles, artillery, and trucks. Soviet military advisers, in Tanzania since 1964, provide training and supervise and maintain major weapon systems, such as surface-to-air missiles.

- Until recently, the TPDF had been largely shielded from Tanzania's steady economic decline since the late 1970s. The armed forces have their own farms and cattle and receive priority allocation for oil during shortages.

- Nyerere helped create a privileged class of senior officers by allowing them to own private businesses and appropriate military resources for their use.

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Nyerere [ ] provided for overseas training, and personally made most of the decisions affecting the military. [ ]

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- Senior officers were integrated into the country's ruling party and government bureaucracy, with many high-level government and party posts specifically reserved for appointed military personnel. In our view, this has positioned the military for assuming a greater role in the political arena. [ ]

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### Change and Discontent

Military frustration over economic troubles has led to declining morale and was the primary motivation for the unsuccessful coup attempt in early 1983, in our judgment. The military's situation is even worse now.

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**Defense Minister Salim: The Military's Friend**

*The TPDF reacted favorably to the appointment of former Prime Minister Salim Salim as Defense Minister.*

*Salim is regarded by the TPDF as well educated, considerate, and concerned with the military's best interests. Although from the island of Pemba—the TPDF draws its strength from the mainland—we believe Salim has been able to establish a strong base of support with all ranks of the TPDF.*

*Salim brings experience as an international diplomat to his new position, and he is likely to use his position to further his political aims and to solidify his popularity within the military. We believe that he is a pivotal figure in the Mwinyi government, especially because he retains his powerful position as secretary of the Security and Defense Commission of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Tanzania's sole political party.*

*We believe he may attempt to erode the influence of officers from Nyerere's native Musoma region and will take action against the military's endemic corruption, moves that would be calculated to improve military conditions and give himself a heroic image.*

Military effectiveness has sharply deteriorated, in our judgment [redacted] TPDF is unable to maintain adequate standards for even routine operations. Most equipment is inoperable because of its age, lack of spare parts and lubricants, and poor storage facilities. Misuse by untrained and inexperienced soldiers has disabled equipment. The Army has been unable to provide basic levels of training because of fuel and equipment shortages.

The Mwinyi government is trying to clean up the military. [redacted] Ministry of Defense has urged the TPDF to form an inspectorate branch at its national headquarters. This branch was probably established to examine the pervasive corruption and graft that are eroding morale and draining military finances and stockpiles. This investigative group will report directly to Defense Minister Salim and will circumvent Chief of Defense Forces Musuguri, Nyerere's nephew, [redacted]

The inspection team probably is too small to make lasting inroads, and we believe continued corruption in the midst of economic crisis will further alienate lower ranking officers and enlisted men from privileged senior officers. [redacted]

**Delusions of Grandeur**

Despite its problems, the TPDF still struggles to play its traditionally active regional role by providing training and aid for neighboring troops. It strongly supports the government's virulent antiapartheid stance and membership in the Frontline States organization and provides training to African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

In our view, prospects for a military coup are slight for the near term. Although dissatisfaction with Nyerere's meddling and Mwinyi's lackluster performance could cause isolated demonstrations of discontent, no group in the Army appears sufficiently motivated to undertake a coup. This is partially a reflection of remaining apolitical traditions, reluctance to assume responsibility for Tanzania's economic ills, and respect for the legitimacy of the government and constitutional process. The possibility of a spontaneous uprising on the part of junior officers and enlisted men whose morale may be approaching an alltime low probably is greater than a coup by senior officers, but we still judge the overall chances of a coup during the next year as less than one in four.

In our view, little effective training ever occurs. The TPDF itself is inadequately trained, suffers from poor morale, and is consumed with its own internal problems. In addition, facilities for foreign troops undergoing training are poor, lacking sufficient housing, water, and sanitary conditions.

**Military Designs?**

Although there is no recent evidence of coup plotting, we believe three groups within the military may react to worsening economic conditions by moving against the government:

- Officers from Nyerere's native Musoma district who fear a dwindling of their perquisites under Mwinyi. They are concerned particularly over the impact of the imminent retirement of their patron, Army Commander General Musuguri, and the threat this would pose to those who hold high-ranking party and government positions.
- Officers who are alarmed by what they view as Nyerere's adverse influence and Mwinyi's inactivity in the face of economic crisis. They probably would install a government that will undertake immediate reform measures, including signing an IMF agreement.
- Lower ranking officers and enlisted men, who could try to seize power in a spontaneous reaction to economic privation, such as delayed or canceled delivery of food to barracks in Dar es Salaam.

In our view, the military's concern with governmental paralysis and the continuation of Nyerere's failed policies will lead the Army to interject itself into the decisionmaking process. We believe that most Army officers now favor a departure from Nyerere's socialist strictures and a move toward pragmatic economic reform. The TPDF is likely to demonstrate a new awareness of policies affecting fuel supplies, military liaison possibilities, and national liberation groups.

A greater political voice for the military, however, is unlikely to bring much improvement in military living conditions, facilities, training, or equipment.

As long as the government remains unable to face the economic collapse and military corruption, low morale will fester and the chance of an enlisted or junior officer coup increases.





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## Somalia: Expanding the Search for Economic Aid

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Continuing economic difficulties and growing uncertainty over the commitment of key aid donors—particularly the United States and Saudi Arabia—have led Somalia to look elsewhere for financial assistance. In recent months Mogadishu has sought to increase political and economic ties to several Asian states, and the US Embassy reports that President Siad plans to expand the aid search to include a number of European and Arab countries. Somalia's prospects for winning major new aid commitments are slim because of its extremely backward economy, but we believe political factors—such as donor country desire for international recognition and influence—will attract limited development assistance and help reduce domestic pressure on Siad to curtail moves toward Western-sponsored economic reforms.

### Unmet Expectations

Somalia made some progress toward improving its economic situation in 1985, including better export and GDP performance and reduced inflation. The economy, however, still suffers from serious foreign exchange shortages caused by high debt servicing requirements, high import dependence in combination with limited export products and markets, and low productivity of investment. The situation is aggravated by a continuing Saudi ban on the import of Somali cattle and Somalia's underdeveloped infrastructure. In addition, a buildup of arrears to the IMF has recently threatened Somalia's standby agreement and underscored the need for ready access to foreign assistance.

US Embassy reporting indicates that Siad's dissatisfaction with the quantity of US aid and investment and strained relations with Saudi Arabia—aggravated by Riyadh's unwillingness to help Mogadishu clear up its IMF arrears—have increased his concern over the reliability of Somalia's primary benefactors. Facing the prospect of future aid reductions, Siad has launched his aggressive search for additional sources of financial assistance, focusing primarily on China, South Korea, and Japan.

According to the Embassy, Siad also had plans—subsequently postponed because of injuries he sustained in a recent auto accident—to continue the aid quest this summer with visits to Turkey, Romania, North Yemen, and probably Egypt.

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### Openings to the East

Somalia has formal ties to only a few Asian nations—largely because it cannot afford to staff many diplomatic missions overseas—and tries to maintain contacts with Asian states primarily through international organizations such as the United Nations and the Nonaligned Movement. According to the US Embassy, since late 1985 Somalia has used these international forums and other bilateral meetings to lobby several key Asian states for expanded political and economic ties:

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- Somalia's attendance at an economic conference in Seoul last October led to a visit in December to Mogadishu by a high-ranking South Korean delegation.
- In November, a high-ranking Somali Foreign Ministry official paid a rare visit to Tokyo. In February 1986, Tokyo announced that it would provide a grant-in-aid of \$3.9 million for a water development project.
- In March 1986, Siad hosted Chinese President Li Xiannian, and the two sides reportedly discussed a variety of issues designed to build on their longstanding and mutually beneficial friendship.

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Prior to the visit of the South Korean delegation, Mogadishu raised the prospect of establishing diplomatic relations, but the price tag appears to have been too high for Seoul. According to the Embassy, Somalia insisted on Korean investment in large-scale

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aid projects, including an elaborate electric steel mill. Seoul reportedly was shocked by the scale of the Somali requests and has offered only training, technical assistance, and possible joint private-sector business ventures. With all North Korean development assistance to Somalia halted because of P'yongyang's developing ties to Ethiopia, we believe Mogadishu eventually will settle for a limited aid program in the hopes of expanding it at a later date.

[redacted]

[redacted] Japan [redacted] did promise to increase its modest aid program to nearly \$18 million per year and has agreed to finance a number of smaller projects. For example, Tokyo recently began a project to modernize the Mogadishu telephone system and also has entered into an agricultural equipment agreement. [redacted]

Unlike its relatively recent relations with South Korea and Japan, Somalia has a long history of political and economic cooperation with China. Somalia was one of the first African states to recognize China, and President Siad visited there twice in the 1970s. According to the US Embassy, the Chinese have completed many highly visible development projects in Somalia over the years, including the country's only north-south highway. China maintains some 600 civilian technicians in Somalia, many of whom are involved in the construction of roads and donor agency projects. Beijing also has provided military assistance in the form of 30 fighter aircraft and military technicians. Although initially Somali-Chinese relations were based primarily on China's efforts to counter Soviet influence in Africa, the Embassy reports that Beijing now appears to favor relations based on mutual economic cooperation. During the visit of President Li Xiannian, for example, the two countries discussed the prospect of additional Chinese economic and military assistance and the rescheduling of Somalia's debt. [redacted]

### Outlook

Somalia's poor economic prospects, its inability to repay foreign loans, and its lack of a well-developed infrastructure will continue to discourage outside investment and deter most donor involvement with large-scale projects. The US Embassy believes that these factors will preclude any substantial increase in Chinese aid despite Mogadishu's close ties to Beijing. Nevertheless, for mostly political reasons, Japan, South Korea, and China are likely to provide funding for small, clearly focused projects that will help fill important gaps. Although Siad will have little in the way of investment opportunities or economic exchanges to offer, he probably will gain some additional economic—and possibly military—assistance by emphasizing Somalia's ties to the Arab world and its willingness to support donor country positions in international forums. [redacted]

In our view, Somalia's efforts to solicit foreign aid reflect Siad's increasing concern over the long-term reliability and extent of US and Saudi assistance. In recent years Siad has been particularly critical of the level of Western aid to his country, and we believe Somalia's problems in paying its IMF arrears—together with the threat of declining US aid in the future—could increase domestic pressure on him to reverse Western-encouraged economic reforms. Moreover, the strains in Somali-Saudi relations—recently fueled by Siad's crackdown on Saudi-sponsored Islamic activities—probably have heightened his fears of a retaliatory Saudi aid cut. In any event, we believe even limited Somali success in finding alternative aid donors will help alleviate internal pressure on Siad to back away from economic reforms and bring much-needed relief to a floundering economy. [redacted]

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## Africa Briefs

<b>Mozambique</b>	<b>Improving Capital's Air Defenses</b> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 50px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	25X1
	<p><span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 250px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> continuing improvements to Maputo airfield in southern Mozambique. Two fighter revetments have been built since late February, and a third is under construction. Paving of an extended parking apron is continuing, and preparations are under way for surfacing all new taxiways. The Mozambicans have increased security around the airfield by establishing new gun emplacements north of the airport. In April, components of an SA-2 missile system were sighted for the first time in Mozambique at a support facility north of the capital. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 60px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span></p>	25X1
	<p>The upgrading is proceeding slowly. At least nine more fighter revetments appear to be under development. These improvements would allow for the redeployment to Maputo of some MIG-21 aircraft now based at Nacala in northeastern Mozambique. The SA-2s will enhance the capital's defense by complementing the existing SA-3 system. At the present pace, however, it will be at least a year before improvements are completed and an integrated air defense system is in place. Moreover, the Mozambicans might not eventually base MIG-21s at Maputo, fearing that such an action would provoke South Africa, whose border is less than 50 miles from the capital. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 70px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span></p>	25X1
<b>United Nations</b>	<b>Special Session on Africa</b> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 45px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>	25X1
	<p>The UN Special Session resolution this month that endorsed an African five-year program for economic recovery probably has improved the climate for a continued economic dialogue between Africa and the international community. International support is crucial to the recovery program, which calls for \$128 billion in financing of which \$45 billion would be required from external sources. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 55px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span></p>	25X1
	<p>While the session agreed that increased economic support for Africa was necessary, there were few specific commitments by individual donor countries. According to press and US diplomatic reporting, Canada offered to place a 15-year moratorium on Africa's debt repayments, and Italy is considering a debt moratorium, restructuring, or rescheduling. Some African delegates were reportedly disappointed at the lack of financial commitments by the international community. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> most Western donors believe that Africa should make more efficient use of available internal and external resources, while implementing economic reforms that will promote economic recovery. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 45px; height: 15px; vertical-align: middle;"></span></p>	25X1
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**Secret****Djibouti****Gouled Bites the Bullet** 

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President Hassan Gouled has responded to a recent French report on Djibouti's fiscal problems by ordering a 10-percent across-the-board cut in government's operating budget and by adopting several reforms designed to promote budgetary savings, according to the US Embassy. Since 1982, expansionary fiscal policies, falling revenues, and declining French aid have caused severe budget deficits, more foreign debt, and sharply reduced cash reserves. The French technical mission's report reportedly maintained that the liquidity of the banking system will be threatened if the government continues to rely on drawing down the country's cash reserves to finance budget deficits. Gouled has avoided austerity measures in the past because of the adverse impact they would have on his key supporters in the government bureaucracy and Army, but the report apparently convinced him that government deficits must be reduced while the country is still solvent.

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The belt-tightening measures probably will pull Djibouti through the 1986 fiscal year, and, because they are limited and are spread evenly throughout the ministries, they are unlikely to alienate his supporters. We believe the Gouled regime could face a severe budget crunch in 1987, however, without increased revenues, additional foreign aid, or further fiscal reforms. In the likely event that Gouled does not get enough economic assistance or revenues, he will come under increasing pressure to trim the bloated government bureaucracy and generous social welfare programs inherited from the French. We believe Gouled probably will attempt to postpone significant—and politically risky—reforms until after the presidential election in 1987, while pressuring France—the country's primary economic benefactor—to fill any financial gaps.

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**Angola Chronology****May 1986** 

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*4 May* President dos Santos visits Soviet Union, accorded red-carpet treatment. General Secretary Gorbachev assures Angola of continued USSR commitment. Later  agreement reached to reschedule Angola's approximately \$1.5 billion debt to USSR.  25X1  
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*7 May* UNITA leader Savimbi confirms that he has received military aid from the United States during a press briefing in South Africa. Savimbi also states that UNITA defenses are prepared for impending Angolan offensive.  25X1

*10 May* France announces that it will assign a military attache to Luanda. French military attaches are often involved in arranging military arms sales. Appears to be further evidence of increased French interest in southern Africa.  25X1

*15 May* Foreign Ministry announces that Angola will establish an embassy in Brasilia. Brazilian President Sarney states desire to improve cultural and economic ties and strengthen bilateral relations.  25X1

Record number of Soviet arms shipments and heavy-lift transport aircraft have delivered military equipment to Angola over the past six months. The large-scale effort probably is intended to replenish Luanda's supply of weapons and materiel before its next offensive against UNITA.  25X1

PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat visits Angola and receives warmest reception of entire African tour. Arafat and dos Santos issue joint communique declaring traditional ties of friendship between the Angolan and Palestinian peoples.  25X1

*16 May* Indian Prime Minister and current Chairman of the Nonaligned Movement, Rajiv Gandhi, arrives in Luanda for a one-day official visit. Gandhi emphasizes India's solidarity with the Frontline States on southern Africa, promises increased ties to Angola.  25X1

*28 May*  Cuban combat brigade near Angola's capital now almost complete. Elements began arriving in 1984. Bringing number of combat brigades to 13, increased Cuban presence will improve security and free more Angolans for fighting.  25X1  
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*30 May*

[redacted] South African mechanized battalion out of northern  
Namibian garrison. South African and Angolan forces reportedly clashed in prior  
week. Pretoria probably trying to divert Angola from UNITA, but claims target  
was SWAPO guerrillas. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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